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We study the joint decisions of offering Mail-in rebates (MIR) in a single-manufacturer-
single-retailer supply chain using a game theoretic framework. Either party can offer an MIR to 
the end consumer if it is in his best interest. The consumer demand is stochastic and depends on 
the product price and the amount of MIRs. When the retail price is exogenous, we show the 
existence of a unique Nash equilibrium under both additive and multiplicative demand functions 
and characterize it completely. We show that any of the following four scenarios can be the 
equilibrium: both parties offer MIR, only one party offers MIR, none offers MIR. When the 
retail price is a decision variable for the retailer and that the rebate redemption rate increases 
with the amount of MIR, we once again prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium where 
both the retailer and the manufacture offer MIRs. Using a numerical study, we show that the 
average post-purchase price of the product is higher not only than the perceived pre-purchase 
price but also than the newsvendor optimal price without an MIR. This implies that an MIR 
makes a product look cheaper while the consumers actually pay more on an average. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mail-in rebate (henceforth abbreviated as MIR and/or called rebate) is a common 
promotional tool used in marketing consumer products and/or services. An MIR offers a delayed 
incentive to a consumer by offering cash (or gift cards) upon the purchase of a product, a bundle 
of products (e.g. a desktop computer along with a monitor and printer), or an upgrade. MIRs are 
common in consumer products ranging from software and electronics to home appliances and 
cosmetics. Millman (2003) notes that $10 billion worth of consumer rebates were offered in the 
United States in 2002. Further, the amount of unpaid rebates in the personal computer industry 
alone was estimated to have reached $10 billion by the year 2005 (Tugend, 2006). Young 
America Corporation, a rebates clearinghouse, handles almost 60 million rebates every year on 
behalf of its clients (Source: http://www.young-america.com/promotions_rebates.html, retrieved 
on 3/30/2009). A search of the website of the popular electronics retailer J & R Music & 
Computer World by the authors found 521 products with MIRs on 3/30/2009.  
MIRs usually require consumers to follow certain rules to redeem cash, such as collecting 
the paperwork, filling out the forms, cutting UPC codes, and sending out the rebate request 
within the correct time frame.  MIR redemption rate rarely reaches 100 percent.  Some 
consumers do not apply, while some others apply but are not paid (Lisante, 2006). Despite 
proliferation of MIRs, consumer complaints about MIRs have soared. Consumers suspect that 
companies design the rules to keep redemption rates down. According to an article in Business 
Week (Grow, 2005), “what rebates do is get consumers to focus on the discounted price of a 
product, then buy it at full price.” However, “processors and companies offering rebates insist 
that there is no intentional effort to deny them… the rules are aimed at stopping fraud.”   The 
academic research establishes that MIRs serve multiple purposes from the perspectives of 
manufacturer and/or retailer including increasing the sales of a new/upgraded product (Banks 
and Moorthy, 1999), disposing excess inventory (Kumar et al., 1998), encouraging brand 
switching (Ali et al., 1994) and improving profit (Soman, 1998). 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the joint mail-in rebate decisions of a retailer and 
a manufacturer in a supply chain under demand uncertainty. We consider a supply chain 
consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The manufacturer produces a single 
product and sells it exclusively through the retailer. Either party can, however, offer an MIR to 
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the end consumer if it is in its best interest. The consumer demand is stochastic and is affected by 
the amount of rebates. Under such circumstances, we use game theoretic models to answer the 
following questions. Why is MIR offered? How to characterize Nash equilibrium of the game 
when both manufacturer and the retailer consider offering MIRs? When will the MIRs be offered 
by both parties versus by only one party? How are optimal MIR decisions and profits affected by 
consumers’ valuation of MIRs and by the rebate redemption rate? Our analyses also show how 
answers to such questions might differ across additive and multiplicative demand functions. We 
also compare our work with the literature. 
Manufacturer’s MIR is common in various product categories such as home appliance, 
consumer electronics, and software. Electronics retailer Best Buy supports MIRs on its products 
offered by Best Buy as well as various manufacturers.1 Similar information can also be found on 
the websites of Staples and Office Depot. Sears, on the other hand, notes on its website that a 
vast majority of the MIRs on its products are directly supported by Sears2
Our paper shows that when the retail price is exogenous, there exists a unique Nash 
equilibrium to the MIR game under both additive and multiplicative demand functions. 
Depending upon the problem parameters, all four possible scenarios of MIR described above can 
be the equilibrium. We characterize sufficient conditions for each of the four MIR scenarios to 
be the Nash equilibrium. Our numerical study suggests that the expected profits of both retailer 
and manufacturer increase with the customers’ valuation for MIR and decrease with the rebate 
. On a recent purchase 
of a Motorola cellular phone at Staples, one of the authors received two concurrent MIRs on it, 
one from Motorola and another from Staples. During the fourth quarter of 2008, GE was offering 
MIRs of varying amounts on home appliances sold through Lowe’s. Lowe’s, concurrently, was 
offering an MIR of an amount equal to local delivery charges for any appliance purchase over 
$397. Finally, many products are sold without any MIR. These examples illustrate that each of 
the following four scenarios is common in practice: both the manufacturer and the retailer offer 
MIRs concurrently, only the manufacturer offers the MIR, only the retailer offers the MIR, and 
no party offers MIR.  
                                                          
1 Source: 
http://www.bestbuy.com/site//olspage.jsp?id=cat12098&entryURLType=&categoryId=cat10007&type=page&entry
URLID=&contentId=1087340679900,  retrieved on 3/26/2009 
2 Source: https://www.mysearsrebate.com/faqs.aspx, FAQ # 12, retrieved on 3/30/2009 
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redemption rate. We also consider a more general case where the retail price is a decision 
variable for the retailer and that the rebate redemption rate increases with the amount of MIR. 
We once again prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium, where both the retailer and the 
manufacture offer MIRs. Using a numerical study, we show that the average post-purchase price 
of the product is higher not only than the perceived pre-purchase price but also than the 
newsvendor optimal price without an MIR. This implies that an MIR makes a product look 
cheaper while the consumers actually pay more on an average. 
Our work makes the following contributions to the operations management literature. The 
literature typically considers MIR offered exclusively by the manufacturer. While the amount of 
MIR is still a decision variable, the literature exogenously assumes that the retailer will not offer 
MIR. The only work that we are aware of where the decision to offer an MIR is endogenous to 
the model is by Cho et al. (2009). They consider the case where either the manufacturer or the 
retailer (or both) can offer an MIR. However, they model the consumer demand using a simple 
deterministic demand function. We provide a generalization of these works by considering 
stochastic demand and simultaneous and endogenous decision making where both parties 
consider offering MIR. A newsvendor framework is used to model demand uncertainty. In our 
model, the decision to offer an MIR and its amount are determined endogenously by the Nash 
equilibrium outcome of the game between the retailer and the manufacturer. To the best of our 
knowledge, our work is the first to study simultaneous MIRs with endogenous decisions under 
demand uncertainty. We compare and contrast the results of our simultaneous game with those 
from exclusive games where either the manufacturer or the retailer alone offers MIR. When both 
rebate and retail price are decision variables, we show that the manufacturer offers a lower MIR 
in a simultaneous game compared to an exclusive game with manufacturer MIR. We also show 
that the expected profits of both the retailer and the manufacturer are higher in the simultaneous 
game compared to an exclusive game with retailer MIR. Our numerical studies suggest that a 
similar relationship about the expected profits might hold between the simultaneous game and 
the exclusive game with manufacturer MIR. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review the appropriate literature 
in the next Section. Section 3 describes our models and results when the retail price is 
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exogenous. We consider a more general case with endogenous retail price and rebate dependent 
redemption rate in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Rebates have been studied extensively in both operations and marketing literature. The 
marketing literature typically looks at the pricing and consumer choice issues under rebates, 
while the operations literature typically focuses on the over-all supply chain dynamics including 
inventory and profit implication of rebates.  
Rebates, in marketing literature, are widely considered as a form of price discrimination 
between high- and low-reservation price consumers (Narasimhan, 1984; Gerstner and 
Holthausen, 1986; Tirole, 1989; Gerstner et al., 1994). Indeed, Blattberg and Neslin (1990) have 
described rebates as the “durable goods analog” of coupons. Gerstner and Hess (1991a, 1991b, 
1995) compare a push strategy where a manufacturer offers a trade discount to the retailer and a 
pull strategy where the manufacturer offers rebates directly to consumers. The market consists of 
the high and the low consumers. They find that MIR can be profitable even if all consumers 
redeem the rebate and price discrimination does not occur. Citing the post-purchase delay 
associated with the redemption of an MIR, Chen, Moorthy, and Zhang (2005) argue that MIRs 
present a seller with an opportunity of price discrimination within a consumer, giving discounts 
when they are most valuable, and withholding it when they matter least. They argue that this 
might increase a consumer’s upfront willingness to pay. Using a game theoretic framework, 
Khouja and Zhou (2009) examine manufacturer’s MIR in a single-manufacturer-single-retailer 
supply chain where the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. They find that rebates are 
profitable for the manufacturer if consumers are inconsistent in the sense that their valuation of 
rebate when they make purchase decisions is independent of redemption probabilities.  
The operations management literature considers two types of rebates, the sales rebate that 
goes from a manufacturer to a retailer when certain conditions for sales are met; and the 
consumer rebate that goes directly to a consumer. The focus of our work is on consumer rebate. 
As a result, we choose not to review the literature on sales rebate contracts. Aydin et al. (2008) 
provide a recent review of this literature in their paper. The literature on consumer rebate often 
uses the newsvendor model as a building block to study MIRs in a single-manufacturer-single-
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retailer supply chain. Arcelus et al. (2005) consider the joint pricing and ordering policies of 
such a retailer. Both additive and multiplicative demand functions are considered. The 
manufacturer provides a direct price discount with zero rebates or a rebate with zero price 
discounts. Arcelus et al. (2007) extends their earlier work by incorporating stochastic rebate-
redemption rate that depends upon the rebate value itself. Their main finding is that the 
introduction of uncertainty in the redemption rate leads the rebate policy to dominate its price-
discount counterpart.  Further extensions of these works include incorporation of risk averseness 
(Arcelus et al., 2006) and information asymmetry (Arcelus et al., 2008). Chen et al. (2007) 
consider a game where the manufacturer makes decisions on wholesale price and MIR while the 
retailer makes decisions on retail price as a Stackelberg follower. Consumers are divided into a 
rebate-sensitive segment and a rebate-insensitive segment. Their key result is that unless all of 
the customers redeem the rebate, it is in the manufacturer’s best interest to offer rebate and that 
the instant rebate does not necessarily benefit the manufacturer. Aydin et al. (2008) also consider 
manufacturer MIR under exogenous wholesale price. The manufacturer in their model sets the 
MIR while the retailer sets the retail price and the order quantity under a multiplicative demand 
function. They find that the retailer gets a fixed fraction of the supply chain profit. Cho et al. 
(2009) consider a single-manufacturer-single-retailer supply chain where both parties 
strategically consider offering MIRs. The MIR expands the consumer demand; however, there is 
a fixed cost associated with administering the program which reduces the profit of the party 
offering it. Using a deterministic demand model they determine the equilibrium of the game and 
characterize the conditions under which a firm should offer rebates at equilibrium. 
Finally, there is a stream of literature in operations management that studies advance 
booking discount (ABD) using the newsvendor setting. Unlike an MIR which is a delayed 
discount, an ABD is an early purchase discount for the consumers. Under the ABD scheme a 
retailer allows the consumers to purchase a product at a discounted price before the selling 
season. The consumers under the ABD program are guaranteed delivery during the selling 
season, while the consumers not under the scheme pay a higher price during the season and are 
not guaranteed availability. Tang et al. (2004) study the dynamics of the ABD program using a 
newsvendor setting and determine the optimal discount rate. They show that ABD program 
generates additional sales for the retailer. A similar scheme has also been considered by Weng 
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and Parler (1999), while McCardle, Rajaram and Tang (2004) consider a competitive version of 
the ABD scheme. 
Our paper also considers consumer rebates in a single-manufacturer-single-retailer supply 
chain under a newsvendor framework. Unlike ABD, we study MIR, which is a delayed incentive 
for consumers. We allow both retailer and manufacturer to offer MIRs and that the decision to 
offer an MIR is determined by the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game between them. 
Our modeling framework, thus, is similar to that of Cho et al. (2009). There are, however, 
important differences between our work and theirs. Unlike Cho et al., we consider a stochastic 
consumer demand and use a newsvendor framework to study MIR. To the best of our 
knowledge, ours is the only paper to consider joint rebate decisions in a newsvendor framework.  
Further, the fixed cost of offering MIR is not the focus of our analysis.  As a result, we differ 
extensively from Cho et al. (2009) in terms of model formulation, analyses, and the resulting 
insights. We compare and contrast our results with those from literature where appropriate. 
 
3. THE MODEL AND ANALYSES 
Consider a supply chain involving a single manufacturer selling a single product over a 
single time period to a single retailer at a constant wholesale price w. Each unit of the product 
incurs a production cost c > 0. The retailer resells the product to the end consumers at a retail 
price p. We will let Q denote the retailer’s order quantity. The demand is uncertain and is 
affected by the amount of MIR. We will consider both additive and multiplicative demand 
functions. Both the manufacturer and the retailer consider offering MIR. The amount of MIR is a 
decision variable for any party offering the MIR. We will assume that the wholesale price is 
exogenously fixed. While this assumption is mainly for analytical tractability, it is also an 
approximation of the environment where the rebate offers constitute a further stage of decision 
making in a supply chain with a well-established wholesale price. The examples of such supply 
chains are consumer electronics, home appliance, etc. Furthermore, such assumption is standard 
in literature (Aydin et al., 2008; Arcelus et al., 2005, 2007). We will, for this section, further 
assume that the product retail price p is also exogenous to our model. We relax this assumption 
in the next Section. The rationale behind the exogenous retail price assumption is as follows. An 
MIR is a temporary and delayed incentive for consumers that allows a retailer to maintain the 
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current price point. Thus, in practice, the product retail price rarely changes because of the 
introduction/expiration of an MIR. In line with this observation, this Section treats the product 
retail price to be exogenous. Section 4 considers the case where the retail price is a decision 
variable.  
We model the scenario in which both the manufacturer and the retailer decides on MIR. 
Note that the decision to offer an MIR is endogenous to our model and is determined by the Nash 
equilibrium outcome of the game between the manufacturer and the retailer. The MIR is non-
negative. Hence a zero MIR at equilibrium simply means that it is optimal for a party to not offer 
any MIR.  We will let 0≥Rr  and 0≥Mr denote the MIRs of the retailer and the manufacturer 
respectively while *Rr  and 
*
Mr  will denote values of the corresponding quantities at equilibrium. 
We assume that the consumers treat $1 MIR as the equivalent of a $α price deduction. The 
quantity α  represents the effective fraction of MIR that the consumer values. Such modeling 
approach is standard in the literature on MIR (Aydin et al., 2008).  We call α to be the rebate 
sensitivity parameter. We assume that consumers are homogenous in the sense that they treat the 
manufacturer and the retailer MIRs equally. Therefore, when the product retail price is p  and 
both the manufacturer and the retailer offer MIRs, the effective price perceived by the consumers 
at the time of purchase is )( MR rrp +−α , 10 ≤≤ α . We further assume that a constant fraction 
β, 10 ≤≤ β , of the consumers can successfully redeem the rebate and that the consumers who 
redeem an MIR successfully from the manufacturer/retailer will also redeem it successfully from 
the retailer/manufacturer. Such an assumption, once again, is standard in literature (Arcelus et 
al., 2006; Aydin et. al., 2008), and its evidence is well-documented in the popular business press 
(Bulkeley, 1998). We will relax the assumption of constant redemption rate in Section 4.  
The timing of the events is as follows. The wholesale and the retail prices are exogenous. 
In the first stage of the game, the manufacturer and the retailer simultaneously decide on the 
amount of MIRs. After observing the MIRs, the retailer places his order Q  with the 
manufacturer. Finally, the consumer demand is realized. The remainder of this section is 
organized as follows. We will consider both additive and multiplicative demand functions to 
model the consumer demand. Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, will model and analyze these 
two demand functions.  
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3.1. Additive Demand Function 
We will use the demand function εαα +−−−= )( MR rrpbND  to model the consumer 
demand, where, N and b are constants, and D , p , Rr  , and Mr respectively are the product 
demand, retail price, and MIRs offered by the retailer and the manufacturer respectively. The 
randomness in demand is modeled through the random variable ε ,  defined on [A, B] with 
0≥> AB . In order to assure that positive product demand is possible for some range of the 
retail price p , we will assume 0≥+− AbpN .  The product retail price is exogenous. We will let 
f(.), F(.), and µ, respectively, denote the probability density function, the cumulative distribution 
function, and the mean of the random variable ε. We will assume that ε exhibits increasing 
failure rate (IFR).  Many commonly used distributions exhibit IFR, such as, the normal 
distribution, power distribution, uniform distribution, Beta distribution with both parameters 
greater than or equal to one, Gamma distribution with shape parameter greater than or equal to 
one, etc.  The IFR assumption is widely used in operations management literature (Lariviere and 
Porteus, 2001). 
The analyses of our paper will follow the standard techniques used in the price setting 
newsvendor literature where the stocking quantity and the price are set simultaneously. A reader 
is referred to Petruzzi and Dada (1999) for a complete description and analytical treatment of the 
problem. Following the standard approach, we define a stocking factor, z, given by 
)}({ MR rrpbNQz αα −−−−≡ and write the profit functions in terms of z . The variable z is a 
proxy for service level, the probability that consumers do not encounter a stock out. It also 
represents the number of standard deviations that stocking quantity deviates from expected 
demand (Silver and Peterson 1985).   
 
3.1.1. Retailer’s Optimal Response 
We solve the game using the standard technique of working backwards beginning with 
the final stage of the game. Given two rebates Mr and Rr  from the manufacturer and the retailer, 
the retailer decides the order quantity Q  to maximize his expected profits. The retailer’s 
expected profit function is given by: 
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),,( Qrr RMRπ  
wQQDErQDpE R −−= ),min(),min( β   
)())()()(( zwzzrrpbNwrp MRR Λ−Λ−+−−−−−= ααβ = ),,( zrr RMRπ ,  (1) 
where ∫ −=Λ
z
A
dxxfxzz )()()(  is the expected leftover factor. Taking the first order derivative 
with respect to z  and noting that the second order condition for maximization of (1) is satisfied, 
we get, 
wzFrpzzrr RRMR −−−=∂∂ ))(1)((/),,( βπ . (2) 
By setting (2) to zero, we have 
))/(1()( 1 RR rpwFrz β−−=
− . (3)   
Define 0z  to be the retailer’s optimal stocking factor when he does not offer a rebate, i.e.,  
      )/1(10 pwFz −≡
− .  (4) 
It is easy to see from (3) and (4) that, 0)( zrz R ≤ if and only if 0≥Rr . Thus, the non-negativity of 
the MIR can also be expressed as a constraint 0)( zrz R ≤ . The retailer solves for the optimal 
rebate decisions next. Using the chain rule of differentiation, the first order necessary condition 
with respect to the retailer’s MIR can be written as follows. 
 
 
.)(),,(),,())(,,(
R
RRMR
R
RMR
R
RRMR
dr
rdz
z
zrr
r
zrr
r
rzrr
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ πππ
 
 
Note that the second term in the right hand side of the above equation is zero as 
0/),,( =∂∂ zzrr RMRπ . Setting the above expression to zero and simplifying we get, 
      
 
22
))(()(),( MMR
r
b
zzbpNwpbzrr −Λ−+−−−=
βα
βα .  (5) 
Combining equations (2) and (5) we get 
)](
))(1(
2))(([
2
))(1()),,(,(
M
MRMR rwpb
zF
bwzzbpN
b
zF
z
zzrrr
βααβ
α
π
+++
−
−Λ−+−
−
=
∂
∂ .  (6)           
 
Lemma 1.  Given a non-negative MIR from the manufacturer, 
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(a) the retailer’s profit function )),,(,( zzrrr MRMRπ is quasi-concave in the stocking factor z, and 
that it has a unique maximizer )( Mrz  that satisfies 0/)),,(,( =∂∂ zzzrrr MRMRπ .   
(b) the retailer’s best response stocking factor and best response MIR, respectively, are given by 
}),(min{)( 0
* zrzrz MM = and β/))]((1/([)(
**
MMR rzFwprr −−= . 
 
Proofs for all results are included in the Appendix. Lemma 1(a) indicates that for a non-negative 
MIR from the manufacturer, there is a unique stocking factor )( Mrz  that maximizes the retailer’s 
expected profit. However, when the manufacturer’s rebate is very large we might have a scenario 
where 0)( zrz M > . This implies, from (3) and (4), a negative MIR from the retailer. Thus, we 
impose the non-negativity constraint 0)( zrz M ≤  into retailer’s maximization problem. With such 
a constraint, due to quasi-concavity of the retailer’s profit function )),,(,( zzrrr MRMRπ , the 
optimal stocking factor )(* Mrz  is the minimum of )( Mrz  and 0z  as formally stated in Lemma 
1(b).   Once the best response function )(* Mrz is known, the corresponding MIR can be derived 
from setting equation (2) zero. We further have the following result. 
 
Proposition 1: Retailer’s best response stocking factor increases in the manufacturer’s MIR and 
that retailer’s best response MIR decreases in manufacturer’s MIR.  
 
The findings in Proposition 1 are intuitive.  All else being equal, as the manufacturer’s MIR 
increases, the acquisition cost of the consumer goes down. Under this scenario, the manufacturer 
bears the extra cost of the rebate while the retailer does not incur any additional cost. As a result, 
the retailer reacts by increasing his stocking factor which is a proxy for the retailer’s service 
level. The intuition behind the retailer’s best response MIR is similar. As the MIR from the 
manufacturer increases, the product demand increases. The rational retailer, as a result, decreases 
his own MIR which allows him to take advantage of the manufacturer’s rebate without incurring 
any additional cost. 
 
3.1.2. Manufacturer’s Optimal Response 
 Given a non-negative MIR from the retailer ( 0≥Rr ), the manufacturer can infer the 
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retailers stocking factor )( Rrz from (3) and incorporate this information to make his own decision 
about the MIR Mr .  The manufacturer’s expected profit function is given by  
).,min()(),,( QDErQcwQrr MRMM βπ −−=   
Using the definition of stocking factor z, we can rewrite the manufacturer’s profit as  
)()())](()()()[(
))(,,(
zcwrzrzrrpbNrcw
rzrr
RRMRM
RRMM
Λ−+Λ−+−−−−−= ααβ
π
 .   (7)   
Taking first derivative with respect to Mr  and setting it to zero yields 
22
)))(()(()()( RRRRM
r
b
rzrzbpNcwbrr −Λ−+−−−=
βα
βα .     (8) 
It is analytically impractical to solve Mr  in terms of  Rr  from (8). So we invert )( Rrzz = to 
)(zrr RR =  and work with the stocking factor z .  Such a technique is common in literature; for 
example, see Lariviere and Porteus (2001), and Song et al. (2008).  Substituting (3) into (8) 
yields  
βα
αβα
b
zFwpbzzbpNcwbzrM 2
))(1/(())(()()( −−−Λ−+−−−= .  (9) 
The rebate )(zrM derived from (9) is not guaranteed to be non-negative.  However, it is easy to 
verify that 0/)),(,( 22 ≤∂∂ MRMM rzzrrπ , implying that for a given z, the manufacturer’s profit 
function is concave in his rebate Mr . This allows us to characterize the manufacturer’s best 
response MIR for non-negative MIRs. The following Lemma states our result. 
 
Lemma 2:  Given a non-negative MIR from the retailer, the manufacturer’s best response MIR, 
(z)r*M , is given by }(z),{r(z)r M
*
M 0max= , where (z)rM  is defined by (9) and is convex in z. 
 
Lemma 2 characterizes the manufacture’s best response in terms of the retailer’s stocking factor. 
From its convexity, the function (z)rM  is either increasing in z or is decreasing in z  before 
increasing in it. This implies that unlike the retailer’s best response MIR, the manufacturer’s best 
response MIR can be either decreasing or increasing in retailer’s MIR. The manufacturer’s profit 
is directly affected by the retailer’s order quantity. The retailer’s order quantity, in turn, is 
determined by the random demand and the desired service level. The consumer demand 
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increases in response to a higher MIR from the retailer. However, because of the shrinking profit 
margin, the retailer’s service level goes down as well (per equation 4).  If the demand effect 
dominates the service level effect, retailer orders more and the manufacturer takes the 
opportunity to reduce his MIR for better profit margin. On the other hand, when the service level 
effect dominates the demand effect, retailer may order less. In such a scenario, the manufacturer 
should provide more MIR in an effort to increase demand and thereby improving order quantity.  
We are now ready to describe the Nash equilibrium of the game.  
 
3.1.3. Nash Equilibrium 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 characterize the best response functions of the retailer and the 
manufacturer respectively. The non-negativity of MIRs makes the best response functions non-
differentiable. To facilitate the characterization of the Nash equilibrium, we temporarily ignore 
the non-negativity constraints.  In such a scenario, Nash equilibrium can be found by setting 
equation (6) equal to zero and solving the resulting equation simultaneously with (9). This 
yields: 
0)])(1/[(3))(()(2)( =−−+Λ−+−+−−− zFwpbzzbpNwpbcwb αβαα .  (10) 
The following lemma describes the solution of (10). 
 
Lemma 3: 
(a) There exists a unique solution sz  to equation (10).   
(b) sz  decreases in the rebate sensitivity parameter α  and increases in the redemption rate β , 
while )( sR zr increases in α  and decreases in β .   
 
Lemma 3(a) states that ignoring the non-negativity of the MIRs, the best response functions of 
the retailer and the manufacturer can be solved uniquely. Lemma 3(b) further describes the 
properties of zs, the solution to equation (10). Thus, zs represents the Nash equilibrium when 
none of the two non-negativity constraints on MIRs are binding. Under such a scenario, per 
Proposition 3(b), as the rebate sensitivity parameter increases, the retailer’s MIR increases while 
his stocking factor decreases. The result is intuitive. An increase in the rebate sensitivity 
parameter indicates that consumers perceive an MIR to be closer to a direct price reduction. The 
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retailer responds to this by offering a higher MIR which further expands the product demand 
which may result in higher expected sales. However, a higher MIR reduces the margin of the 
retailer as well, which in turn results in a lower stocking factor. On the other hand, as the 
redemption rate increases, the retailer’s MIR decreases while his stocking factor increases. A 
higher redemption rate negatively affects the profit margin of the retailer without expanding the 
consumer demand. As a result, the retailer’s MIR goes down with the redemption rate. Once the 
non-negativity constraints of the MIRs are reintroduced, the best response functions described in 
Lemmas 1 and 2 become non-differentiable. Fortunately, there still exists a unique Nash 
equilibrium as shown below.  
 
Proposition 2: Depending upon the problem parameters, any of the following four scenarios can 
be the unique Nash equilibrium of the MIR game between the manufacturer and the retailer: no 
party offers MIR, only the retailer offers the MIR, only the manufacturer offers the MIR, both 
parties offer MIR. Specifically, the equilibrium can be characterized as follows. 
(a) If 0zzs <  and 0)( >sM zr , then szz =
* , and )( ** zrr MM = . 
(b) If 0zzs <  and 0)( ≤sM zr  , then 0
* =Mr , and }),0(min{ 0
* zzz = . 
(c)  If 0zzs ≥ , then 0
* zz = , and }0),(max{ 0
* zrr MM = .  
 
Proposition 2 characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium of the MIR game in terms of the 
manufacturer’s rebate and the retailer’s stocking factor. Once the retailer’s equilibrium stocking 
factor z* is known, his equilibrium MIR is automatically determined from equation (3). Recall 
that zs, in Proposition 2, is the solution to equation (10); while z0 is the retailer’s optimal stocking 
factor when no party offers MIR, and  z(0) is the retailer’s optimal stocking factor if the 
manufacturer does not offer MIR. Figures 1(a)-1(d) schematically describe the four possible 
equilibrium scenarios. In each of these figures we have plotted )(zrM  against )( Mrz . When the 
non-negativity constraints for the two MIRs are not binding, per Lemmas 1 and 2, these two 
functions respectively represent the best response functions of the manufacturer and the retailer 
(shown in solid lines in the figures). Once a non-negativity constraint becomes binding, the best 
response function no longer follows the original curve (shown in dotted lines), but is given by 
the solid vertical line. Proposition 2(a) describes the scenario where both the retailer and the 
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manufacturer offer an MIR, as illustrated by Figure 1(a). Proposition 2(b) describes the scenario 
where the manufacturer does not offer MIR while the retailer may or may not offer it. Figure 
1(b) shows a scenario where the retailer offers an MIR and the manufacturer does not. Note from 
this figure that )( sM zr  is negative while the retailer’s best response stocking factor is positive 
and is given by z(0). Thus, only the retailer offers MIR at equilibrium. Proposition 2(c) describes 
the scenario where the retailer does not offer MIR while the manufacturer may or may not offer 
an MIR. Per Lemma 2, the manufacturer’s best response MIR is given by }(z),{r(z)r M
*
M 0max= . 
Thus, the condition 0)( >sM zr does not necessarily imply that the manufacturer will offer an 
MIR. Figures 1(c) and 1(d) respectively describe the situations where the manufacturer does and 
does not offer MIRs. 
  
        Figure 1(a): Illustration of Equilibrium   Figure 1(b): Illustration of Equilibrium 
 
      
     Figure 1(c): Illustration of Equilibrium           Figure 1(d): Illustration of Equilibrium  
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Proposition 2 provides complete technical characterization of the equilibrium. We 
explore the properties of the Nash equilibrium and develop interesting insights in Proposition 3 
below and the numerical study following it. For the ease of exposition, define 
))/1(()/1( 11 pwFpwFbpN −Λ−−+−=∆ −− , which represents the retailer’s expected sales 
when no party offers MIR.  
 
Proposition 3:   
 (a) The retailer offers a mail-in-rebate at equilibrium, (i.e., 0* >Rr ) if and only if 
)/( bwp αβ∆>− , and )/(32 bcwp αβ∆>+− .  
(b) The manufacturer offers a mail-in-rebate at equilibrium (i.e., 0* >Mr ) if  
 0)/()(2 >+−−−− bbpNpcw αµβ .  
 
Proposition 3(a) gives the necessary and sufficient condition for the retailer to offer MIR. The 
stated conditions are likely to be satisfied when the manufacturer’s wholesale price is low. We 
found several products with retailer’s MIR at Staples’ rebate center website 
(www.stapleseasyrebates.com) on 6/1/2009. Interestingly, many of these MIRs were for 
refurbished/remanufactured printers/fax machines and Staples-branded products. This is 
consistent with the findings of our model as the wholesale prices for such products are likely to 
be low. The conditions in Proposition 3(a) are also likely to be satisfied when the retail price and 
the rebate sensitivity parameters are high and the rebate redemption rate is low. This implies that 
a high retailer margin is, once again, conductive for offering an MIR. Proposition 3(b) provides a 
sufficient condition for the manufacturer to offer MIRs at equilibrium. The condition is likely to 
be satisfied when the rebate sensitivity parameter α and the manufacturer’s margin w – c is 
relatively high, while the redemption rate β is relatively low. A higher margin allows the 
manufacturer to offer the MIR which lowers the acquisition cost of the consumer and results in a 
higher demand. The higher consumer demand, in turn, increases the retailer’s order quantity. 
Packaged consumer software (e.g. multimedia software) is a product category that demonstrates 
such characteristics. This perhaps explains the wide-spread use of manufacturer MIR in that 
category.  A higher value of the rebate sensitivity parameter makes an MIR more valuable to a 
consumer, resulting in an MIR from the manufacturer. Combining the results of Propositions 
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3(a) and 3(b), we see that both the retailer and the manufacturer will offer MIRs for moderate 
values of wholesale prices, high rebate sensitivity parameter and low values of redemption rate. 
 
Numerical Examples 
We now turn to a numerical study to provide examples of the equilibrium and to develop 
additional insights. Our computations are based on the following data: 100=N , 2=b , 
]30,100[~ Nε , 10=c , 43=w  and 67=p .  Figure 2(a) plots the retailer’s and the 
manufacturer’s equilibrium MIRs as a function of the rebate sensitivity parameter α for a fixed 
value of the redemption rate ( 3.0=β ). The plot shows that neither party offers MIR for small 
values of the rebate sensitivity parameter (α < 0.2). As the sensitivity parameter increases (0.2 ≤ 
α < 0.6), the manufacturer offering MIR becomes the equilibrium. Finally, as  α  increases 
further, both the manufacturer and the retailer offering MIRs becomes the Nash 
equilibrium. Figure 2(b) plots the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s equilibrium MIRs as a 
function of the redemption rate β  for a fixed value of the rebate sensitivity parameter ( 6.0=α ).  
It shows that both parties offer MIR when the redemption rate is low ( β < 0.3). As the 
redemption increases (0.3 ≤ β < 0.7), the manufacturer offering MIR becomes the equilibrium. 
Finally, as β increases further, no party offers MIR at equilibrium. Figure 2(b) has an interesting 
implication. The number of rebate redemptions seen by the retailer is always a fixed fraction β of 
his actual sales. However, the number of rebate redemptions seen by the manufacturer is at most 
a fraction β of his actual sales. In fact, when the retailer has leftovers, the number of rebate 
redemptions seen by the manufacturer is strictly less than the fraction β of his actual sales. This 
fact makes it feasible for the manufacturer to offer MIR at such a value of β when it is no longer 
feasible for the retailer to offer an MIR (0.3 ≤ β < 0.7, in Figure 2b). 
 Figure 2(c) plots the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s equilibrium MIRs as a function of 
the wholesale price w  with 6.0=α , 4.0=β  and 67=p . It shows that only the retailer offers 
MIR when the wholesale price is low ( w < 35). As the wholesale price increases (35 ≤ ω < 40), 
both the manufacturer and the retailer offering MIR becomes the equilibrium. Finally, as  w  
increases further, only the manufacturer offering MIRs becomes the Nash equilibrium. Figure 
2(d) plots the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s equilibrium MIRs as a function of the retail price 
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p  with 6.0=α , 4.0=β and 43=w .  It shows that only the manufacturer offers MIR when the 
retail price is low ( p < 65). As the retail price increases (p ≥ 65), both the manufacturer and the 
retailer offering MIR becomes the equilibrium. In summary, our numerical study complements 
our analytical findings in Propositions 2 and 3 by demonstrating how the nature of the 
equilibrium changes with changes in problem parameters. We were able to obtain three of the 
four possible equilibriums by changing a single parameter in Figure 2(a)-2(c). We, however, 
were unable to find an example where all four equilibriums can be obtained by changing the 
value of a single parameter.  
 
   
     Figure 2(a):  MIR as a function of α                    Figure 2(b):  MIR as a function of β
    
    Figure 2(c):  MIR as a function of w                   Figure 2(d):  MIR as a function of p   
 
How do the parameters α  and β  affect the expected profits? While the effects are hard 
to establish analytically, our extensive numerical experimentation indicates that the retailer’s 
profit, the manufacturer’s profit, and hence, the supply chain’s profit increase in α  and decrease 
in β . Figure 3, based on the data for Figure 2(a), illustrates this. As the rebate sensitivity 
parameter increases, the consumers perceive an MIR to be closer to a direct price reduction, and 
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the demand for the product increases. This may result in higher expected sales for both the 
retailer and the manufacturer at no extra cost. As a result, the expected profits go up. On the 
other hand, the redemption rate of an MIR directly affects the profitability of any party offering 
it. Thus, as the redemption rate increases, the expected profits decline.  
 
                                       
                                    Figure 3:  Expected profit as a function of α                   
 
3.1.4 Comparison with Literature 
We mentioned in Section 2 that the literature considers the scenario where the MIR is 
offered by a single party, typically by the manufacturer. Thus, these papers will exogenously 
assume that the retailer will not offer a rebate, while the amount of rebate to be offered is still a 
decision variable for the manufacturer. Our work is a generalization of the literature in the sense 
that we let both the retailer and the manufacturer offer mail-in rebates. Our modeling framework 
can easily be adapted to the special cases considered in literature by substituting z0 from equation 
(4) into Lemma 2, i.e., by forcing the retailer’s MIR to zero. To facilitate the comparison of our 
work with the literature, we will call the framework of our paper as simultaneous game while 
that of the literature as exclusive game with manufacturer MIR. A reader will immediately notice 
that a third scenario, while not studied explicitly in literature, is possible where only the retailer 
considers offering MIR. We will call this as the as exclusive game with retailer MIR. This game, 
once again, is a special case of our simultaneous game and can easily be solved from Lemma 1 
by forcing the manufacturer’s MIR to zero. We will next examine the effect of joint mail-in 
rebate decisions in our newsvendor supply chain by comparing the simultaneous game with the 
two exclusive games. The following corollary describes our result. 
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Corollary 1: The retailer offers a lower MIR, a higher stocking factor, and derives a higher 
expected profit in a simultaneous game compared to an exclusive game with retailer MIR. 
Corollary 1 is intuitive. Both parties share the burden of offering MIRs in a simultaneous 
game. This forces the manufacture to share at least some of the demand risks in the supply chain. 
As a result, the retailer is able to offer a lesser MIR and a higher service level. How does the 
manufacturer’s MIR compare under the simultaneous and exclusive games? Per Lemma 2, the 
manufacturer’s MIR response function is not guaranteed to be decreasing in retailer’s MIR. Note 
that the retailer’s optimal stocking factor in an exclusive game with manufacturer MIR is given 
by z0 defined in equation (4). The retailer’s optimal stocking factor in a simultaneous game is 
less than z0. Thus, the manufacturer will offer a lower MIR in a simultaneous game when the 
condition )()( 0 zrzr MM ≥  holds for any 0zz < . A sufficient condition to ensure such a scenario 
is )/()( bAwp αβµ −≥− . This condition is likely to hold when the profit margin for the retailer 
is high and/or the ratio β/α is low. A higher retailer margin, a lower rebate redemption rate, and a 
higher rebate sensitivity represent a favorable environment for the retailer. As a result, the 
strategic manufacturer offers a lower rebate in a simultaneous game compared to an exclusive 
game with manufacturer MIR. We further illustrate the differences between the simultaneous 
game and the exclusive games using a numerical study. 
 
Numerical Examples 
Table 1 below provides two illustrative numerical examples based on the following data: 
100=N , 2=b , ]30,100[~ Nε , 10=c . We have used the notations *Mπ and 
*
Rπ to denote the 
equilibrium expected profits of the manufacturer and the retailer respectively in the Table.  In the 
first example, both the manufacturer and the retailer offer MIRs at equilibrium under a 
simultaneous game. They also offer positive MIRs under exclusive games. Comparing the 
magnitudes of the equilibrium rebates we see that both parties offer less rebates in a 
simultaneous game. The consumers, however, enjoy a higher total rebate under a simultaneous 
game. As indicated by the numbers in bold, the equilibrium expected total supply chain profit in 
the simultaneous game is at least as large as (strictly higher in the first example) that in the two 
exclusive games. Interestingly, however, each of the two players prefers an exclusive game 
where the other player offers the MIR. The second example is instructive. Only the manufacturer 
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offers MIR in the simultaneous game and that the outcome of this game is identical to that of an 
exclusive game with manufacturer MIR. The dynamics of the two games, however, are 
fundamentally different. In the exclusive game with manufacturer MIR, it is exogenously 
determined that the retailer will not offer MIR. In the simultaneous game, it is optimal for the 
retailer not to offer any MIR. The second example once again underscores the fact that the 
expected total supply chain profit in the simultaneous game is at least as large as those in the two 
exclusive games. Are the consumers better off in the simultaneous game compared to the 
exclusive games? Our examples in the current Section assume that the product retail price is 
exogenous. Under this assumption, whether the consumers are better off with a simultaneous or 
an exclusive game is determined solely by the magnitudes of the rebates. As can be seen from 
Table 1, consumers in the simultaneous game enjoy an aggregate rebate that is at least as large as 
the rebates received in an exclusive game. This implies that both the providers (the manufacturer 
and the retailer) and the consumers are (weakly) better off in a simultaneous game compared to 
the exclusive games. 
 
Table 1: Simultaneous Vs. Exclusive MIR Games 
Parameters & Games Equilibrium 
MIR 
*z  *Mπ  
*
Rπ  
*
*
M
R
π
π +
 
43=w  
67=p  
9.0=α  
4.0=β  
Simultaneous game 
(Our work) 
 (rM*,rR*)  
= (26.9, 3.5) 
88 2492 2002 4494 
Exclusive game with  
manufacturer MIR 
 28 89 2382 2041 4423 
Exclusive game with  
retailer MIR 
18 83 2679 1048 3727 
42=w  
68=p  
8.0=α  
8.0=β  
Simultaneous game 
(Our work) 
(rM*, rR*) 
=(3.6, 0) 
89 1833 953 2786 
Exclusive game with  
manufacturer MIR 
3.6 89 1833 953 2786 
Exclusive game with  
retailer MIR 
1.8 90 1818 889 2707 
 
3.2 Multiplicative Demand Function 
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We consider the following iso-elastic demand function in our analyses for the current 
section: εαα bMR rrpD
−−−= )( .  The parameter b  in the demand function represents the price 
elasticity. Such demand function is common in literature (see for example, Petruzzi and Dada, 
1999). For the reasons of analytical tractability, we assume that 2≥b .  This assumption is purely 
technical in nature and ensures the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, such 
assumption is standard in literature (Petruzzi and Dada, 1999;   Boyaci and Ozer, 2009). It is a 
reasonable assumption when the consumers are highly sensitive to price. Section 1 of the paper 
describes several examples of MIRs involving consumer electronics, home appliances, cell 
phones, etc. The easy availability of comparison shopping over the internet makes consumers of 
such products highly price sensitive. As in the previous section, we will, once again, write the 
retailer’s order quantity in terms of a stocking factor z defined by zrrpQ bMR
−−−= )( αα . Our 
results and analyses in this section are similar to those in Section 3.1. As a result, we omit the 
details of the analyses and simply highlight the differences in results between the additive and 
multiplicative demand functions.  
 
Proposition 4: Under the multiplicative demand function: 
(a) The retailer’s best response stocking factor decreases in manufacturer’s MIR; and retailer’s 
best response MIR increases in manufacturer’s MIR.  
(b) The manufacturer’s best response MIR decreases in retailer’s stocking factor and increases 
in retailer’s MIR.  
 
Comparing Proposition 4 with Proposition 1 and our numerical study, we see that the best 
response behavior of the retailer and the manufacturer differ under additive and multiplicative 
demand functions. Proposition 4(a) indicates that as the manufacturer increases his MIR, the 
retailer also increases his MIR and decreases service level. We provide the following intuitive 
explanation. In response to a higher MIR from the manufacturer, which expands demand, the 
retailer can either improve his margin by reducing his MIR or can further expand the demand by 
increasing his MIR.  When the demand highly price sensitive ( 2≥b ), the later effect dominates 
the former and the retailer increases his own MIR to improve upon the expected profit. 
Proposition 4(b) indicates that as the retailer increases his MIR, so does the manufacturer. The 
intuitive explanation for this behavior is similar to that in Proposition 4(a). Thus, the 
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manufacturer and the retailer’s MIRs are strategic complements under the multiplicative demand 
function. While the best response behaviors of the retailer and the manufacturer differ under 
additive and multiplicative demand functions, the following proposition shows that there still 
exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the MIR game under multiplicative demand function with 
mild assumptions. 
 
Proposition 5: There exists a unique equilibrium of the MIR game under multiplicative demand 
function when )1/()2( −−≤ bbwc . 
 
Proposition 5 establishes the existence of unique Nash equilibrium for )1)(2( −−≤ bbwc .  This 
condition is a technical one.  It will hold when the manufacturer’s profit margin is high and 
production cost is low. Who offers MIRs at equilibrium? Our extensive numerical 
experimentation suggests that all four scenarios (both parties offering MIR, only one party 
offering MIR, and none offering MIR) can once again be the unique Nash equilibrium depending 
upon the values of the problem parameters. For the reasons of brevity, we omit the numerical 
examples and conclude this section by comparing the simultaneous game with the exclusive 
games with retailer and manufacturer MIRs. 
 
Corollary 2: Under the multiplicative demand function, the retailer (the manufacturer) offers a 
higher MIR in a simultaneous game compared to an exclusive game with retailer (manufacturer) 
MIR. The retailer offers a lower stocking factor in the simultaneous game compared to an 
exclusive game with retailer MIR. 
Our discussion in this sub-section shows that some of the dynamics of the MIR game are 
different across the additive and multiplicative demand functions. Our main finding of the 
existence of unique Nash equilibrium and that of the validity of four MIR scenarios continue to 
hold across the two demand functions.   
 
4. ENDOGENOUS RETAIL PRICE 
 The analyses in the previous section are based on the assumption that the retail price is 
exogenous. We relax this assumption in this section and explore the case where the retail price is 
a decision variable for the retailer. We limit our analyses to the additive demand function only 
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and discuss the multiplicative demand function briefly at the end. The timing of the events is as 
follows. In the first stage of the game, the manufacturer and the retailer simultaneously decide on 
the amount of MIR. After observing MIRs, the retailer determines the retail price p and his order 
quantityQ . Finally, the consumer demand is realized. The retailer’s maximization problem from 
equation (1) can be rewritten as:  
 
)()]()()()[(),,(
,,
zwbrbrrpbzzNwrpzrrMax RMRRRMRzrp R
Λ−−++−−Λ−+−−= βααββπ                                
)ˆ( wp −= )()](ˆ)([ zwbrbrpbzzN RM Λ−−++−Λ−+ βαα ,       (11) 
 
where, Rrpp β−=ˆ . The term )( βα −Rbr in (11) represents the retailer’s revenue attributed to 
the difference between the rebate sensitivity parameter and the redemption rate. It is easy to see 
that when α > β, the retailer should choose the retail price p and the rebate rR so that the term 
)ˆ( wp −  is positive and the term )( βα −Rbr is very large. Similarly, when βα < , the rebate Rr  
should be as small as possible (i.e., 0* =Rr ). When βα = , there will be multiple optimal 
solutions with different combinations of  *Rr  and 
*p  that satisfy *** ˆ Rrpp β+= , where the 
optimal *p̂   is unique and can be solved as in a standard price-setting newsvendor’s problem 
(Petruzzi & Dada, 1999).   
In order to get more meaningful insights, we will further assume that the redemption rate 
depends on the amount of MIR, i.e., )( RR rββ =  and )( MM rββ = , with 0(.)' ≥β  and 0(.)'' ≥β
. This assumption allows us a more general framework to study the mail-in rebates. It is also 
consistent with the intuition that consumers are increasingly likely to redeem a rebate 
successfully as the cash value of the rebate goes up. Having different rebate redemption 
functions for the manufacturer and the retailer (for example, MRiriii ,),( == ββ ) does not yield 
additional insights. We also assume 0)0( =β , i.e., the redemption rate is zero when no MIR is 
offered. We assume that the rebate sensitivity parameterα  to be same for manufacturer and 
retailer rebates. Our insights remain qualitatively the same if we relax this assumption.  The 
following proposition describes our first result.  
 
Proposition 6:  
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(a) Retailer’s equilibrium mail-in rebate *Rr  is uniquely determined by the solution of the 
problem RRr rrMaxR
)}({ βα −  and that the following condition must hold at equilibrium: 
RRr ββα => )(
* .               (12) 
(b) The retailer’s equilibrium rebate and equilibrium redemption rate )β(r *R  are increasing in 
the rebate sensitivity parameter α.   
 
Per Proposition 6(a), the retailer’s equilibrium MIR depends only on the rebate sensitivity 
parameter and the redemption rate function. In particular the equilibrium MIR of the retailer does 
not depend on the manufacturer’s rebate Mr . Note that unlike Section 3.1, the retailer (or the 
manufacturer) in our current setting can control the redemption rate by changing the amount of 
the rebate offered. Thus, the condition Rβα >  in (12) simply implies that the retailer should 
design his rebate such that the redemption rate is strictly less than the rebate sensitivity 
parameter. A similar condition can also be found in Khouja and Zhou (2009) who study 
manufacturer MIR. It is also worthwhile to mention that our model does not require any 
additional assumption about the relative magnitudes of α and Mβ for its feasibility. Proposition 
6(b) indicates that the retailer’s equilibrium MIR (and hence the equilibrium redemption rate) is 
increasing in the rebate sensitivity parameter. 
 We next turn our attention to the derivation of the Nash equilibrium of the game. The 
manufacturer’s expected profit function is given by 
),,,ˆ( * zrrp RMMπ  
)()()])(ˆ()()[)(( * zcwrrpbzzNrrcw MRRMM Λ−+−−−−Λ−+−−= αβαβ  .  (13) 
The Nash equilibrium of the game can be derived from equation (11) and (13) using standard 
techniques. The following proposition characterizes it. 
 
Proposition 7:  There exists a unique Nash Equilibrium to the MIR game with endogenous retail 
price. At equilibrium, both the manufacturer and the retailer offer MIR.  
 
Proposition 7 confirms the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the game under 
endogenous retail price. However, unlike Proposition 2, both parties offer MIRs at equilibrium 
under endogenous retail price. 
Geng, Qin, and Suman Mallik. "Joint Mail-In Rebate Decisions in Supply Chains Under Demand Uncertainty." 
Production and Operations Management (2010): 581-602. Publisher’s official version: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2010.01171.x. Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. 
Please share your stories about how Open Access to this item benefits you.  
 
27 
 
 We explore the properties of the Nash equilibrium through a numerical study based on 
the following data: 10=c , 2=b , 100=N , ]30,100[~ Nε . We use the following redemption 
functions in our computations: RRR rr 1.0)( == ββ  and MMM rr 1.0)( == ββ . To facilitate our 
discussion, we will call the quantity )( *** MR rrp +−α to be the perceived price, while the 
quantity *** MMRR rrp ββ −−  will be called the redeemed price.  The former of the two 
represents the perceived price of the product before purchase while the latter denotes the average 
price a consumer actually paid for the product after purchase. Define 0p to be the optimal retail 
price in a conventional price-setting newsvendor problem with identical parameters but without 
MIR. We call 0p  to be the baseline price. Figure 4(a) compares the equilibrium retail price to the 
perceived price, redeemed price, and baseline price for different values of the rebate sensitivity 
parameter, and for a constant wholesale price ( 36=w ). Figure 4(b) shows how these prices vary 
with the wholesale price for a fixed value of the rebate sensitivity parameter ( 8.0=α ). We have 
also plotted the manufacturer’s equilibrium MIR in the two figures. We find that the following 
relationship holds consistently in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) as well as in several additional 
computations:    
****
0
*** )( prrpprrp MMRRMR ≤−−≤≤+− ββα . 
Thus, the redeemed price or the average post-purchase price of the product is not only higher 
than the perceived price, it is also higher than the baseline price. This implies that an MIR makes 
a product look cheaper while the consumer actually pays more on an average. In fact, the average 
post purchase price for the consumer is even higher than the newsvendor optimal price without 
an MIR. Interestingly, Soman (1998) used an experimental study involving university students to 
conclude that at the time of a product purchase, the consumers under-weigh future effort relative 
to future savings. Consequently, an incentive that appears attractive at the time of purchase may 
appear unattractive at the time of redemption. Our numerical study directly supports this 
conclusion.   
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  Figure 4(a): Variation of equilibrium prices       Figure 4(b): Variation of equilibrium  
  and decisions with respect to α                           prices and decisions with respect to w         
                     
We next turn our attention to the comparison of simultaneous and exclusive games under 
endogenous retail prices. The following proposition describes our result. 
 
Proposition 8: When the retail price is endogenous, 
(a) the retailer charges a higher retail price and offers a higher stocking factor in a 
simultaneous game compared to an exclusive game with retailer MIR. The retailer offers the 
same mail-in rebate under the two scenarios. Both the retailer and the manufacturer derive a 
higher expected profits in a simultaneous game compared to an exclusive game with retailer 
MIR. 
(b) the retailer charges a higher retail price and offers a higher stocking factor in a 
simultaneous game compared to an exclusive game with manufacturer MIR. The manufacturer 
offers a lower MIR in a simultaneous game compared to an exclusive game with manufacturer 
MIR. 
 
Proposition 8(a) suggests that the simultaneous game gives rise to higher expected profits for 
both the manufacturer and the retailer (and hence for the total supply chain) compared to an 
exclusive game with retailer MIR. It can also be shown analytically that the expected supply 
chain profit in the simultaneous game is higher than that when no MIR is offered (i.e., a price-
setting newsvendor without MIR). Aydin et al. (2008) report a similar result by comparing the 
exclusive game with manufacturer MIR with the no MIR situation. Proposition 8(b) suggests that 
when retail price are endogenous, the manufacturer, unlike the retailer, offers a lower MIR in a 
simultaneous game compared to an exclusive game with manufacturer MIR. The retail price of 
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the product is higher in the simultaneous game compared to either of the two exclusive games. 
The presence of two rebates allows the retailer to set a higher retail price in a simultaneous game 
without suffering a substantial reduction in demand. Given the exogenous wholesale price, a 
higher retail price implies a higher margin as well for the retailer. The higher margin allows the 
retailer to have a higher stocking factor in the simultaneous game compared to the exclusive 
games. 
It is analytically hard to compare the equilibrium price and the expected supply chain profits 
between the simultaneous game and the exclusive game with manufacturer MIR.  As a result, we 
once again, turn to a numerical study. 
 
Numerical Study 
Our objective in this numerical study is to compare the equilibrium expected profits of the 
simultaneous game and the exclusive game with manufacturer MIR. Figure 5(a) compares the 
expected profits of the retailer and the manufacturer (and hence the total supply chain profit) for 
the two games for different values of the rebate sensitivity parameter given a fixed wholesale 
price (w=43).  Observe that the simultaneous game results in higher expected profits for both 
manufacturer and the retailer compared to the exclusive game with manufacturer MIR. Further, 
the expected profits under both games increase as the rebate sensitivity parameter increases. We 
had similar results in Section 3, when the product retail price was exogenous (Figure 3 and Table 
1). Figure 5(b) compares the expected profits of the retailer and the manufacturer for the two 
games for different values of the wholesale price given a fixed value of the rebate sensitivity 
parameter ( 8.0=α ). We once again observe that the expected profits in the simultaneous game 
are higher compared to the exclusive game. Under both the games, the retailer’s and the supply 
chain’s expected profits decrease in the wholesale price due to increasing double marginalization 
effect.  
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Figure 5(a): Change of expected profit wrt α            Figure 5(b). Change of expected profit wrt w         
 
We next compare the two exclusive games with the simultaneous game with respect to 
the perceived and redeemed prices. These yield insights about how the consumers fare under the 
three games. Figures 6(a) and 6(b), respectively, plot the perceived and redeemed prices in the 
three games for different values of the rebate sensitivity parameter α  for a fixed wholesale price 
(w=43).  It is interesting to note from the two figures that the simultaneous game has the lowest 
perceived price, )( *** MR rrp +−α , but the highest redeemed price, 
***
MMRR rrp ββ −− . The 
baseline price (i.e., the optimal solution of a price-setting newsvendor under no MIR) on the 
other hand is higher than all other perceived prices but is lower than all other redeemed prices. 
The two exclusive games have intermediate values of the perceived and redeemed prices. The 
result is intuitive. Two rebates make a simultaneous game look attractive to a consumer. As a 
result, it has the lowest perceived price. However, as discussed in Section 1, rebate redemption 
rate rarely reaches hundred percent. This effect might be more pronounced in a simultaneous 
game in presence of multiple rebates. Thus, the redeemed price is highest in the simultaneous 
game indicating that the consumers on an average pay the highest price under this game and are 
worse off compared to two exclusive games. Figures 6(a) and 6(b) once again suggest that MIRs 
make a product look cheaper but consumers pay more on an average.  
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Fig. 6(a): Change of perceived prices wrt α         Fig. 6(b): Change of redeemed prices wrt α 
 
Comparing our results from Section 3.1 with those from Section 4 we see that the 
equilibrium outcome under endogenous retail price might differ from that under exogenous retail 
price. The exogenous retail price assumption allows four possible equilibrium scenarios while 
the endogenous price assumption results in an equilibrium where both parties offer MIRs. The 
existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium continue to hold under both exogenous and 
endogenous retail prices as does our other key insights regarding the properties of the 
equilibrium. Section 1 of the paper provides examples for exclusive MIRs by the manufacturer 
and the retailer, as well as both parties offering MIR simultaneously. These scenarios are 
consistent with our equilibrium outcome with exogenous retail price. In the authors’ own 
experience, the retail prices rarely change with the introduction/expiration of MIRs.  These facts 
suggest that exogenous retail price might be a reasonable assumption to explain the observed 
practices. 
How do the analyses in Section 4 change under a multiplicative demand function? It can 
be shown that Proposition 6 continues to hold under a multiplicative demand function with 
endogenous retail price. Moreover, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium where both the 
manufacturer and the retailer offer MIR. However, it is analytically hard to establish the 
uniqueness of the equilibrium. It can be shown through a numerical study that simultaneous 
game result in higher expected profits for the manufacturer and the retailer compared to the two 
exclusive games.   
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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MIR is a common promotional tool used in marketing of consumer products. We study 
the joint decisions of offering MIRs in a one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain with 
demand uncertainty. Both the manufacturer and the retailer consider offering MIRs. The end 
consumer demand is stochastic and depends on the price and the amount of MIRs. Using a game 
theoretic framework we study the Nash equilibrium outcome of the game. Both additive and 
multiplicative demand functions are considered. Consistent with our observation that the product 
retail price rarely changes in practice because of the introduction or expiry of MIR, we first 
consider the case where the product retail price is exogenous. We next consider a more general 
case where the product retail price is a decision variable and that the rebate redemption rate 
increases with the amount of MIR. We also compare and contrast our work with the literature, 
which considers MIR offered exclusively by the manufacturer. 
When the retail price is exogenous, we show the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium 
under both additive and multiplicative demand functions and characterize it completely. We 
show that depending upon the problem parameters, any of the following four scenarios can be 
the equilibrium: both parties offer MIR, only one party offers MIR, none offer MIR. The 
manufacturer, in general, prefers to offer MIR when the wholesale price is higher while the 
retailer prefers to offer MIR under lower wholesale prices. As described in the discussion 
following Proposition 3, this result seems to be consistent with  MIR examples found in the 
website of the office supply retailer Staples. These insights can be valuable qualitative guiding 
tools for practicing managers. We discussed how the redemption rate and rebate sensitivity 
parameters affect the equilibrium decisions. We show that under additive (multiplicative) 
demand function, the retailer offers lower (higher) MIR under a simultaneous game compared to 
an exclusive game with retailer MIR. Our numerical studies demonstrate that the expected total 
supply chain profit in the simultaneous game is at least as large as that in a game with exclusive 
MIR from either the retailer or the manufacturer. This is also a valuable qualitative insight for a 
practitioner. 
Under more general conditions, when the retail price is a decision variable for the retailer 
and that the rebate redemption rate increases with the amount of MIR, we once again prove the 
existence of a unique Nash equilibrium where both the retailer and the manufacturer offer MIRs. 
Using a numerical study, we show that the average post-purchase price of the product is not only 
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higher than the perceived pre-purchase price; it is also higher than the newsvendor optimal price 
without an MIR. This implies that an MIR makes a product look cheaper while the consumers 
pay more on an average. An article in Business Week makes a similar argument (Grow 2005). 
Our work explains why the common practice of displaying after-rebate price prominently is 
beneficial to a retailer. We also show that the expected profits of both the retailer and the 
manufacturer are higher in the simultaneous game compared to an exclusive game with retailer 
MIR. Our numerical studies suggest that a similar relationship about the expected profits might 
hold between the simultaneous game and the exclusive game with manufacturer MIR. 
Our work makes the following contribution to the operations management literature. 
First, we examine simultaneous MIR consideration by both the retailer and the manufacturer 
under demand uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to consider 
endogenous rebate decisions under stochastic demand. The literature typically considers the 
scenario where the demand is deterministic or the manufacturer offers MIR. Second, we 
characterize the conditions under which both parties offer MIR, only one party offers MIR, none 
offers MIR. As our examples in Section 1 demonstrate, all four situations are common in 
practice. Third, by comparing our results with the exclusive MIR scenarios, we gain valuable 
insights about expected profits and magnitude of rebates at equilibrium. 
This paper provides several avenues for future research. We consider a single period 
model. Considering a multi-period model, while analytically challenging, will allow us to answer 
questions such as at what stage of a product lifecycle should an MIR be introduced and when 
should it be withdrawn. An MIR can perhaps also be used to eliminate excess/shortage in a 
supply chain and strategically match supply with demand under a multi-period setting. We 
consider a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Extending our framework to multiple 
retailers will allow us to capture the strategic interactions among the retailers in the presence of 
an MIR.  
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APPENDIX: PROOFS OF RESULTS 
 
Proof of Lemma 1  
(a) Rewrite (6) as ),(
2
))(1()),,(,( zrL
b
zF
z
zzrrr
M
MRMR
α
π −
=
∂
∂
,  
where ≡),( zrL M )())(1(
2))(( MrwpbzF
bwzzbpN βααβ +++
−
−Λ−+− . (A1) 
         2))(1/()(2))(1(/),( zFzbwfzFzzrL M −−−=∂∂ αβ .  
   
]
))(1(
)()'
))(1(
1(
))(1(
1)'
)(1
)([(2)(/),( 22
zF
zf
zFzFzF
zfbwzfzzrL M −−
+
−−
−−=∂∂ αβ            
                                0≤  due to IFR.  
So ),( zrL M  is concave in z  given Mr . Moreover, 
0)()(),( ≥+−++−= MM rwpbAbpNArL βαβ and 0),( ≤BrL M . Thus there must exist a unique 
solution )( Mrz  to 0)( =zL . Also, 
0/),(
)(
≤∂∂
= Mrzz
zzrL M ,  (A2) 
thus, 0)),,(,( 0/2
2
≤
∂
∂
=∂∂ z
MRMR
Rz
zzrrr
π
π
.  
Therefore, )),,(,( zzrrr MRMRπ is quasi-concave in z , the maximizer is )( Mrz .  
(b) To ensure 0≥Rr , }),(min{)( 0
* zrzrz MM = . If )()(
*
MM rzrz = , )(
*
MR rr satisfies both (3) and (5). 
If 0
* )( zrz M = , it implies that 0)(
* =MR rr  from (3).   □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
)( Mrz is the solution to .0),( =zrL M From implicit function theory,  
0)(),( =
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
MM
MM
r
L
dr
rdz
z
zrL
. Using equation (A2),  
sign )/)(( MM drrdz = sign( 0)()/),( ≥=∂∂ βαbsignrzrL MM . 
As )0),(min()(
*
MM rzrz =  and that 0z  is independent of Mr , )(
*
Mrz is increasing in Mr . From lemma 
1(b), )(* MR rr  increases in Mr .  □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
From (9), 2))(1(
)())(1()(2
zF
zbwfzF
dz
zdrb M
−
+−−=
β
αββα , so 0/)( 22 ≥dzzdrM  due to IFR.  □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
(a) ≡)(zLs )))(1/((3))(()(2)( zFwpbzzbpNwpbcwb −−+Λ−+−+−−− αβαα  (A3) 
2))(1/()(3))(1(/)( zFzbwfzFzzLs −−−=∂∂ αβ  and 0/)(
22 ≤∂∂ zzLs due to IFR.   
So )(zLs  is concave. Moreover, 0)()()( ≥−++−= cpbAbpNALs αβ and 0)( ≤BLs . Thus, there 
must exist a unique solution to 0)( =zLs .  
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(b) From (A3) and implicit function theory, 
sign ( )/ α∂∂ sz = sign( )/)( α∂∂ zLs )=sign( )))(1/((3)(2)( szFwpbwpbcwb −−+−−−  
 =sign 0)/))((( ≤Λ−+−− αβss zzbpN , where the last equality follows from 0)( =ss zL .  
Similarly, sign )/( β∂∂ sz = sign( )/)( β∂∂ zLs )=sign 0))(( ≥Λ−++ ss zzbpN . Thus sz decreases in 
α and increases in β . Rewrite (3) as  
β/)))(1/(()( zFwpzrR −−= ,  (A4) 
and from which we have 
0
))(1(
)()(
2 ≥∂
∂
−
−=
∂
∂
w
z
zF
zfzr s
s
ssR
αα
β .    
Thus 0/)( ≥∂∂ αsR zr . Similarly, 0))(1(
)()(
2 ≤−∂
∂
−
−=
∂
∂
R
s
s
ssR rw
z
zF
zfzr
ββ
β .  □ 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Let )(~ zrM  be the inverse function of )( Mrz . So )(~ zrM  denotes the manufacturer’s rebate at which the 
retailer responds with z. Then, )(~)()( zrzrzL MMs −≡ . Per concavity of )(zLs ,  0)( ≥zLs  if and only if 
szz ≤ . That is, for szz > , )()(~ zrzr MM > ; for szz = , )()(~ zrzr MM = ;  and  for szz < , 
)()(~ zrzr MM < .  We will call this result Lemma A1. Now, consider the following scenarios. 
(1) If 0zzs <  and 0)( >sM zr , then from lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the equilibrium is szz =
* , and 
)( ** zrr MM = . For uniqueness, we show that  0zz =  cannot be an equilibrium for the following reason: 
given 0zzs < , )()(~ 00 zrzr MM >  per lemma A1; and )( Mrz increases in Mr  from Proposition 1. 
Therefore, ))(())(~( 000 zrzzrzz MM >= . Similarly, 0=Mr cannot be an equilibrium because, as 
0)(~)( >= sMsM zrzr , )0())(~( zzrzz sMs >= from Proposition 1. Thus, given 0=Mr , 
0))0((~))0(( => zrzr MM  from lemma A1.  
(2) If 0zzs <  and 0)( ≤sM zr  , then 0
* =Mr and )),0(min()0( 0
** zzzz ==  from lemma 1(b) is an 
equilibrium. To see this, as  0)()(~ <= sMsM zrzr , )0())(~( zzrzz sMs <=  from Proposition 1. From 
lemma A1, 0))0((~))0(( =≤ zrzr MM . Similarly, as 0zzs < , )(
~)( 00 zrzr MM < . If )0(0 zz < ,  then 
0))0((~)(~ 0 =≤ zrzr MM from Proposition 1. In sum, 0))0(())),0((min(
*
0 ≤= zrzzr MM . From Lemma 
2, 0}0)),0((max{))0(( *** == zrzr MM .  
For uniqueness, we only need to show that 0>Mr  cannot be in equilibrium. This holds as from 
Proposition 1, ssMM zzrzrz => ))(()(  when 0>Mr and 0)( <sM zr  . Therefore, 
sMM zzrzrz >= )),(min()( 0
* . From lemma A1, )).(())((~ MMMMM rzrrzrr >=  
 (3) If 0zzs ≥ , then 0
* zz =  and )0),(max( 0
* zrr MM =  from Lemma 2 is an equilibrium. To see this, 
)()(~ 00 zrzr MM < from lemma A1. From Proposition 1, 
))0),((max())(())(~( 0000 zrzzrzzrzz MMM <<= .  Thus, 00
* ))0),((max( zzrz M =  from lemma 1(b).  
For uniqueness, we only need to show that 0zz < cannot be in equilibrium, which is true because from 
lemma A1 and Proposition 1, ))(())0),((max())(())(~( * zrzzrzzrzzrzz MMMM =≤<=  when 0zz < . □ 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
(a) We first show that if 0)0( zz ≥ , then 0
* =Rr . This is because if  0)0( zz ≥  and  0)(
~ >sM zr , then 
0)0())(~( zzzrzz sMs ≥>=  from Proposition 1, and thus 0
* =Rr  from Proposition 2(c).  On the other 
hand, if 0)0( zz ≥  and  0)()(
~ <= sMsM zrzr , then 0
* =Rr  from Proposition 2(b) and 2(c). This result, 
together with Proposition 2, implies that 0* >Rr if and only if 0)0( zz <  and 0zzs < . From concavity of 
)(zL  and )(zLs , it means that  0
* >Rr if and only if 0)( 0 <zL  and 0)( 0 <zLs  , which is satisfied by 
the specified condition after applying (4).  
(b) From (9),  )/())(()))(1/(()()(2 bzzbpNzFwpcwzrM αββ Λ−+−−−−−−=  
                                     0)/()()()( ≥+−−−−−≥ bbpNwpcw αµβ .  □  
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
The following table lists four exhaustive cases. 
 Retailer’s MIR 
Simultaneous 
Game ( )0≥Mr  
Exclusive Game with 
Retailer MIR  ( )0=Mr  
Case I 0 0 
Case II 0 >0 
Case III >0 >0 
Case IV >0 0 
In Case I and Case II, the retailer provides less MIR in a simultaneous game. For case III, from 
Proposition 1, )0()0( ** ≥≥= MRMR rrrr , which also implies that Case IV cannot exist. From equation 
(3), a simultaneous game results in a higher service level. To compare expected profits, it is easy to see 
from (1) that 0)(/),,( ≥−−=∂∂ wrpbrzrr RMRMR βαπ , thus a simultaneous game results in higher 
expected profits for the retailer.  □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
(a) The retailer’s expected profit function can be written as  
),,( zrr MRRπ  
      ]))()([()( wzzzrprrp R
b
MR −Λ−−−−=
− βαα . 
Taking first order derivative with respect to z and set it to zero yields equation (3), i.e.,  
 wzFrp R =−− ))(1)(( β .  
Taking first order derivative with respect to Rr  and set it to zero yields  
αβ
αβαβα
)1(
))(/()(),(
−
+Λ−−−
=
b
rzzbwzpbzrr MMR . 
Combining the above two equations yields 
0
)1()1(
)(
))(1())()(1(
=
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
Λ−− b
r
b
p
zF
w
zzb
bwz Mβ
α
βα
.  (A5) 
Lemma A2. 
F(z))(1
1
Λ(z))1)(z(b
bz
−
−
−−
decreases in z when b≥2. 
Geng, Qin, and Suman Mallik. "Joint Mail-In Rebate Decisions in Supply Chains Under Demand Uncertainty." 
Production and Operations Management (2010): 581-602. Publisher’s official version: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2010.01171.x. Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. 
Please share your stories about how Open Access to this item benefits you.  
 
39 
 
Proof: Per Petruzzi and Dada (1999), 
))(1(
1
))()(1( zFzzb
bz
−
−
Λ−−
is quasi- concave with IFR 
distribution and if 2≥b . Furthermore, 
AzzFzzb
bz
dz
d
=−
−
Λ−−
]
))(1(
1
))()(1(
[
0/)(
))(1())()(1(
))()(()1())(1))(()(( 2
22
22
≤−=
−Λ−−
Λ−−−−Λ−
= = AAfzFzzb
zzzfbzFzzzFb
Az ,
 
 
which implies that 
))(1(
1
))()(1( zFzzb
bz
−
−
Λ−−  
decreases in z . □   
From (A5), given Mr , )( Mrz that satisfies (A5) decreases in Mr . From (3), )( MR rr  increases in Mr .   
(b) The manufacturer’s profit function can be written as  
),min()(),,( QDErQcwQrr MRMM βπ −−=  
))](()[()( zzrzcwrrp M
b
MR Λ−−−−−=
− βαα .   
Taking first order derivative with respect to Mr  and set it to zero yields  
αβ
αββα
)1(
))(/()(),(
−
+−Λ−−
=
b
rpzzzcwbzrr RRM .   
Rewriting the manufacturer’s best response in terms of z yields 
αβ
αβαα
)1(
))(1/()())(/()()(
−
−−−+Λ−−
=
b
zFwpzzzcwbzrM .  (A6)    
Hence, sign =
∂
∂ ))((
z
zrM  sign ]
))(1(
1)(
))()(1(
[
zFw
cw
zzb
bz
dz
d
−
−
−
Λ−−
. Since
 
]
))(1(
1)(
))()(1(
[
zFw
cw
zzb
bz
dz
d
−
−
−
Λ−−
0]
))(1(
1
))()(1(
[ ≤
−
−
Λ−−
≤
zFzzb
bz
dz
d
,  
0/)( ≤∂∂ zzrM . As 0/ ≤∂∂ Rrz  from (3), 0≥∂
∂
∂
∂
=
R
M
R
M
r
z
z
r
dr
dr
. □                                     
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
We can write )(~ zrM  from (A5). Combining (A5) and (A6) and define  
)](~)([)1()( zrzr
b
bzL MMs −
−
≡
αβ
 
          p
zFzz
z
bw
cwb )(]
))(1(
1
))((
)
)2(
1[()2( βαα −+
−
−
Λ−−
+−−= .    
 If 
1)2(
1
−
≤
−
+
b
b
bw
c , i.e., )1/()2( −−≤ bbwc ,  then from lemma A2,  
0]
))(1(
1
))()(1(
[]
))(1(
1
))((
)
)2(
1[( ≤
−
−
Λ−−
≤
−
−
Λ−−
+
zFzzb
bz
dz
d
zFzz
z
bw
c
dz
d
,  
which implies that 0/)( ≥dzzdLs . If cp ≤− )/1( αβ , then 0)( ≤ALs , together with 0)( ≥BLs , 
there must exist a unique solution sz to 0)( =zLs . This means that for szz > , )()(~ zrzr MM < ; for 
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szz = , )()(~ zrzr MM = ;  and  for szz < , )()(~ zrzr MM > .  The proof of equilibrium with non-negative 
constraints is similar to that in Proposition 2. □   
   
Proof of Proposition 6 
 (a) )](')()[ˆ(/),,,ˆ( RRRRRMR rrrwpbrzrrp ββαπ −−−=∂∂ , which is positive at 0=Rr  and 
negative at ∞=Rr .  So there must exist a solution to 0)(')( =−− RRR rrr ββα . 
 (b) 0/),,,ˆ(
22 /),,,ˆ( =∂∂∂∂ RRMR rzrrpRRMR rzrrp ππ  
0)]('')(2)[ˆ(
0/),,,ˆ(
' ≤−−−=
=∂∂ RrzRrMrpRRRR
rrrwpb
π
ββ . 
So ),,,ˆ( zrrp RMRπ  is quasi-concave and  
*
Rr  is unique.  
0)]()('2/[1/ *''*** ≥+=∂∂ RRRR rrrr ββα . 0/)()(')('
** ≥∂∂= ααβαβ RR rr . □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 
From (11), 0/),,,ˆ( =∂∂ zzrrp RMRπ wzFp =−⇒ ))(1(ˆ . (A7) 
0/),,,ˆ( =∂∂ pzrrp RMRπ  
⇒  
b
brrbrbwzzNp MRR
2
))(()(ˆ αβα +−++Λ−+= , (A8) 
Substituting (A8) into (A7) yields 
02)))(()())((1(),(2 =−+−++Λ−+−≡ bwbrrbrbwzzNzFzrL MRRM αβα .  (A9)   
0),(2 ≥ArL M , 0),(1 ≤BrL M , 0/),( 0),(2 2 ≤∂∂ =zrLM MzzrL , hence there is a unique solution to 
0),(2 =zrL M  and  
0
/
/)(
2
2 ≥
∂∂
∂∂−
=
∂
∂
zL
rL
r
rz M
M
M .  (A10) 
From (13) we have, 
)])(ˆ()()[)(')((/),,,ˆ( ** MRRMMMMRMM rrpbzzNrrrrzrrp αβαββπ −−−−Λ−++−=∂∂  
                                      ))(( MM rrcwb βα −−+  
Given p̂ , z  and 
*
Rr  , 0/),,,ˆ(
2*2 ≤∂∂ MRMM rzrrpπ  . So ),,ˆ(
*
RM rzpr  is solved by setting the above 
first order condition to zero, that is,  
))(( MM rrcwb βα −− 0)])(ˆ()()[)(')((
* =−−−−Λ−++− MRRMMM rrpbzzNrrr αβαββ  .(A11) 
We next show that ),,ˆ( * zrpr RM  satisfying  (A7), (A8) and (A11) is unique.      Substituting  (A8) and 
(A7) into (A11) yields 
0))(1/())(')(())(( =−+−−− zFbwrrrrrcwb MMMMM βββα , from which, (A12)        
.0/)( ≤∂∂ zzrM  (A13)       
From (A10) and (A13), there must exist a unique equilibrium. From (13), 
0)(/),,,ˆ( 0
* >−=∂∂ = cwbrzrrp MrMRMM απ ,  (A14) 
so the manufacturer must offer MIR.  
We next show the existence of equilibrium for multiplicative demand function. By Theorem 1.2 in 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), there exists a pure strategy of equilibrium if the payoff functions are 
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continuous and quasi-concave with respect to each player’s own strategy. We next show that the payoff 
functions of the manufacturer and the retailer are quasi-concave.  
))](()()[())(ˆ(),,,ˆ( zzrrzcwrrpzrrp MMM
b
MRRRMM Λ−−−−−−=
− βαβαπ , 
MRMM rzrrp ∂∂ /),,,ˆ(π  
]))())(()('()))(()()(([1 KzzrrrzzrrzcwbK MMMMMMMM
b Λ−+−Λ−−−= −− βββα , 
where MRR rrpK αβα −−−≡ )(ˆ . 
0/
22 /),,,ˆ( =∂∂∂∂ MM rMRMM rzrrp ππ   
0))]('2)(''())()(')(1())[((1 ≤+++−Λ−−= −− MMMMMMMM
b rrrKrrrbzzK ββββα .  
From ]))((ˆ[))(ˆ(),,,ˆ( wzzzprrpzrrp
b
MRRRMR −Λ−−−−=
−αβαπ ,  
wzFpzzrrp RMR −−=∂∂ ))(1(ˆ/),,,ˆ(π , 
0)())(()1(ˆ0ˆ/),,,ˆ( =−−−Λ−+−−⇒=∂∂ MRRRMR rrzzbwzbppzrrp αβαπ , i.e.,  
     ]
)1(
)(
))(1())()(1(
))[(1(/),,),(ˆ(
−
−−
−
−
−
Λ−−
−=∂∂
b
rr
zF
w
zzb
bwzzFzzrrzp MRRRMR
αβα
π , which 
decreases in z from lemma A2.  □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 8 
(a) From Proposition 6(a), retailer’s rebate is independent of Mr in the simultaneous game as well as in 
the exclusive game with retailer MIR.  
From (A10), )0()( ** zrzz M ≥= . From (A8), ))0((ˆ))((ˆˆ
** zprzpp M ≥= , thus, 
**** ))0((ˆˆ RR rzprpp ββ +≥+= . 
From (11), 0)ˆ(/),,,ˆ(/))(,,),(ˆ( ** ≥−=∂∂=∂∂ wpbrzrrprrzrrzp MMRRMMMRR αππ . 
So )0,0),0(ˆ()0,,ˆ(),,ˆ(
**** =≥≥ RRRRMRR rprprrp πππ . From (13), 
))(()(ˆ)((/),,),(ˆ( *0
*
RrRMM rbzpbzNcwzzrrzp M βαπ −+−+−=∂∂ = . From (A8), given 0=Mr , 
)())(ˆ())(()(ˆ * zwzpbrbzpbzN R Λ+−=−+−+ βα , where the right hand side increases in z  from 
(A7). This implies that given 0=Mr , ))(()(ˆ *RrbzpbzN βα −+−+ increases in z . From (A10) and 
A(14), )0()(
** zrzz M ≥= . Thus, 
))0(,,0)),0((ˆ(),,0),(ˆ(),,),(ˆ( ******** zrzpzrzpzrrzp RMRMRMM πππ ≥≥ .  
(b) Let )0(Mr  denote the equilibrium manufacturer MIR. Suppose )0()(
**
MRMM rrrr >= , 
then from (A11), ))0(())(( ** MRM rzrrzz >= . Then from (A13), 
)0()))0((()))((( ** MMMRMMM rrzrrrzrr =<= , contradiction. So it must be )0()(
*
MRM rrr ≤ . From 
(A13), this implies that ))0(())(( ** MRM rzrrzz ≥= , which further implies that )))0(((ˆˆ
*
Mrzpp ≥ from 
(A7) and )))0(((
**
Mrzpp ≥ . □ 
  
 
 
